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The End of Memory? German-American Relations under Donald Trump  
 
This article examines recent dynamics of collective memory in German-American Relations. 
After an introduction which outlines the importance of history and memory for bilateral 
relations, we trace the evolution of collective memories of the two countries and identify the 
key filters through which they evaluate each other. We then identify the key characteristics of 
German-American relations since the advent of Donald Trump to the American presidency. 
This is followed by an analysis which examines Trump’s use and abuse of history and 
memory and what that means for his foreign policy in general and German-American 
relations in particular. In view of the way Donald Trump has taken the subjective nature of 
collective memories to an extreme by largely disconnecting these memories from their 
historical context at the same time as extensively referencing his own history and experience, 
we argue that we might be witnessing the end of memory, in particular the end of memory’s 
direct impact on political discourse and policy. 
 
All bilateral relationships are filtered through the lens of the past. This is certainly the case 
for the U.S.-German relationship. Indeed, history and memory have been especially 
important for this relationship, particularly from the U.S. side towards Germany, given the 
role of the U.S. in militarily defeating Germany twice in the 20th century and then defending 
the Federal Republic during the Cold War. Moreover, the rise of Holocaust consciousness 
after the 1970s created another layer of memory through which Germany was perceived. But, 
what about the present—almost 75 years since the end of WWII and with a very different 
president now in the White House? 
First, what exactly do we mean when we speak of ‘the past’? Most obviously, there is history, 
a narrative recording of the chronology of previous events with explanations provided for the 
forces or personalities propelling such events. Although the study of history clearly has its 
merits when examining bilateral relations, a focus on collective memory provides an 
important additional dimension for an understanding of the mindsets of political elites which 
provide the basis for their bilateral relationship. As Andrei Markovits and Simon Reich have 
pointed out, ‘history is about cognition and knowledge, collective memory is about 
 experience and feeling. If history is a matter of the past, collective memory is most definitely 
a phenomenon of the present.’1 Or, to follow Pierre Nora, memory is emotionalized and 
motivating—the living past—whereas history encompasses the cold, dry facts with less 
influence on policymaking.2 
Collective memories—shared interpretations of a particularly poignant past filtered through 
the values and worldviews of the present —are important influences in a variety of political 
arenas including foreign policy and various bilateral relationships. Most generally, as 
constructivist IR scholars have argued, memories are ideas that affect the identities and 
values dominant in a political culture. Specifically, foreign policy makers are impacted by the 
memories and cultural environment that surround them. Memory helps to create the lens 
through which a problem or an actor are perceived. Indeed, since ‘all consciousness is 
mediated through it’,3 collective memory plays a pivotal role in opinion and policy formation. 
It acts as a mechanism that provides orientation for groups, nations and states, helping to 
explain and make sense of the world and supplying standards for evaluating a range of moral 
issues.4 
Memory also helps to prime what historical analogies a policy maker might utilise to respond 
to an issue in the present and the abiding lessons those historical experiences are said to 
teach.5 For example, the strong Western response to the Russian intervention in Crimea in 
2014 was clearly affected by parallels drawn to aggressive German expansion in Europe in 
the 1930s, particularly the Sudetenland issue, and the lessons (such as the dangers of 
appeasement) drawn from them.6 Likewise, U.S. policy makers during the Vietnam War were 
deeply influenced by the memory of the Korean War, which, in turn, was impacted by the 
memory of ‘Munich’ in the 1930s.7 More generally, the widespread postnationalism on the 
European continent and the strong Franco-German relationship are deeply conditioned by the 
memory of what happened when nationalism was rampant a century ago and the lessons 
 derived from it. 
Furthermore, there has always been a difference between official policies and diplomatic ties 
and the attitudes of people towards the other side. Sometimes the two dimensions are in sync 
and sometimes the tendencies evolve differently. For example, there has been positive 
sentiment and a pool of goodwill of (West) Germans vis-à-vis Americans over the postwar 
period, even though relations were sometimes better and sometimes worse (depending on the 
chemistry between leaders or specific policy disputes). At times, anti-American sentiment has 
surfaced—but sometimes this did not align with official policy (the NATO ‘double-track’ 
decision) and sometimes it did (opposition to the 2003 invasion of Iraq when Germans and 
their government said no8) Alternatively, despite the continuing animosity of many 
Americans towards Germans after WWII—a critical frame that was strengthened as the 
country was increasingly seen through the Holocaust prism after the 1970s—U.S. policy was 
consistently supportive of (West) German interests. Yet, since the turn of the millennium 
there seems to have been a trend towards warmer attitudes at least at the level of public 
opinion,9 even though policy disagreements have occurred over Germany’s lack of support 
for the invasion of Iraq, for example, leading Condoleezza Rice to suggest to ‘Punish France, 
Ignore Germany and Forgive Russia’.10  
 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF COLLECTIVE MEMORIES 
 
This article looks at the impact of collective memories on the German-American relationship. 
As with any bilateral relationship, history and memory matter—but here the relationship is 
rather complex and asymmetric. Germany with its by now well-developed culture of 
contrition operates in a very high memory context. There is overwhelming evidence over the 
 70+ years of the Federal Republic that the concerns of memory and the lessons from the past 
have conditioned virtually every major international decision—from rearmament in the mid-
1950s, to reunification, the expansion of the European Union and to the establishment of the 
Euro.11 For example, former Chancellor Helmut Kohl repeatedly stated that the EU and the 
euro were necessary to forever overcome a negative historical inheritance. In a famous 
interview from 2002, he noted: ‘Nations with a common currency never went to war against 
each other. A common currency is more than the money you pay with.’ Moreover, ‘I wanted 
to bring the euro because to me it meant the irreversibility of European development ... for 
me the euro was a synonym for Europe going further.’12 
The United States and especially policy makers, by contrast, have appeared much less 
influenced by such concerns. Instead, explanations of American policy decisions approximate 
what realist IR scholars have asserted—calculated self-interest in the context of international 
anarchy and hegemonic U.S. power. Nevertheless, memory does matter even in the ever 
future-oriented USA, but in less conditioning ways than in Germany—the filter of memory is 
more general and modified by other (realist) considerations. This has been increasingly 
apparent since the turn of the millennium and appears particularly the case with the current 
Trump administration. 
 
The US Memory Filters towards Germany 
 
Although we are primarily concerned about the German-American relationship in recent 
decades and the present, in light of the deeply conditioning and lingering impact of history 
and memory, more remote periods should be considered. In the 19th century, there was almost 
no bilateral relationship to speak of (Germany only unified in 1871). Perhaps one could better 
describe a variety of multilateral relationships between various German states (like Prussia or 
 Austria-Hungary), but certainly without the unified impact of a France or Britain. A big 
exception was immigration. For many in the German lands, America with its vast, unsettled 
frontier represented the new world, a land of opportunity. Already at the time of the founding 
there were significant German communities and there were even discussions about making 
German an official language—something early leaders like Benjamin Franklin resisted.13 A 
surge of immigration after the failed revolutions of 1848 attested to this strong draw. Over the 
19th century 7 million Germans emigrated to the U.S.  
Even today, there is a sizeable proportion of the U.S. population that claims German ancestry. 
In 2014 this was still the largest group at about 14 per cent of the population (a quarter of 
whites).14 In 1980, they were 23 per cent of the total population but 28 per cent of whites. In 
1900, 9 per cent of Americans were first or second generation German immigrants, the 
largest group by far.15 Of course, immigrants had very different reasons for coming to the 
U.S. and had varying attitudes towards their home country. But, at many points in time, this 
group has been a factor in U.S. policy and the bilateral relationship. The German-American 
community was a reason for the late entry of the U.S. in WWI, for the lengthy period of 
isolationism and even appeasement in the 1930s, and then arguably it was a force behind the 
staunch defence of the Federal Republic during the Cold War.  
It is an open question what (if any) influence such people exert over the bilateral relationship 
today. One might speculate that this is a moderating force (because of lingering positive 
sentiments towards one’s ancestors’ homeland) when policy makers contemplate a harsher 
stance toward contemporary Germany. Another moderating force is German investment and 
related jobs in the U.S. today. By some estimates 672,000 U.S. jobs are supported by German 
affiliates, making Germany the third largest foreign employer.16 Moreover, about half of 
these jobs are in the manufacturing sector—a major rhetorical focus of the Trump 
administration—and also largely situated in the deep red states of the South.17 Despite the 
 current $68 billion trade deficit that the U.S. has with Germany, and which Trump has 
repeatedly criticized, these commercial ties are broad, deep, and mutually beneficial. Merkel 
certainly tried to convey this point by bringing numerous CEOs of German companies to her 
first meeting with Trump at the White House in March 2017. 
Germany also impacted higher education in the U.S., and thus influenced elites. The 
Humboldtian research university (first adopted at Johns Hopkins University) became the 
model for the modern American university. German influence in various disciplines was 
strong until WWII—an influence that continued with the numerous emigrés from the 1930s 
onwards. Today, strong investments by the German government (through the DAAD--the 
centres of excellence) and generous opportunities for exchanges and research have solidified 
the relationship and created not just venues but a reservoir of intercultural understanding if 
not good will influencing U.S. elites. For example, Obama’s last chief of staff, Denis 
McDonough, spent a year in Germany on a Bosch Fellowship. The more general cultural and 
political infrastructure especially in the U.S. capital—German Marshall Fund of the United 
States, German Historical Institute, Atlantic Council, Bertelsmann and the political 
foundations—are active players in many policy discussions. There are Goethe Institutes in six 
cities and DAAD offices in two.  
From the American side, the Federal Republic has long been viewed through the lens of 
Nazism, World War II and the Holocaust. In a 2015 Pew Survey, 47 per cent (51 per cent in 
the 18-29 group) of Americans, but only 20 per cent of Germans thought WWII and the 
Holocaust were the most important events in U.S.-German relations; 20 per cent of Germans 
but only 3 per cent of Americans said the Marshall Plan. Meanwhile, 35 per cent of Germans 
and 28 per cent of Americans said the fall of the Berlin Wall was the most important 
historical event.18  
 Interestingly, this framing was less pronounced during the (earlier) decades of the Cold War. 
During that time, the FRG was often seen as a front-line state, the last free bulwark against 
the communist menace, and likely the first victim of an invasion from the East (the Fulda 
Gap). West Germany was weak and vulnerable and needed U.S. protection. Brian Etheridge 
calls this the Cold War narrative, in contrast to the world war/Holocaust version.19 It was also 
true that 10 million U.S. servicemen were stationed in Germany over these decades, creating 
a familiarity with the country.20 One could even point to relatively benign depictions of 
WWII-era German and Nazi soldiers (Hogan’s Heroes, The Great Escape). There was more 
focus on the battles and conventional military history (the Rommel/Desert Fox fetish) and 
less on the anti-Semitic, racist and genocidal core of the Nazi project. There appeared to be 
official and popular-culture support for the (long) Adenauer era differentiation of Germans 
from Nazis with the assertion that the criminals were in fact dead or imprisoned. The myth of 
the ‘clean’ Wehrmacht lasted on both sides of the Atlantic until well into the 1990s.21 
Certainly, there was a degree of mistrust, particularly at first, in light of several hundred 
thousand U.S. battle deaths in the two world wars. Even if the draconian Morgenthau Plan 
did not come to pass, many policy makers and citizens agreed with Lord Ismay, 1st NATO 
secretary general, who described the intent of the Atlantic alliance ‘to keep the Russians out, 
the Americans in and the Germans down’. Indeed, U.S. policy makers pursued a strategy of 
‘dual containment’, worried not just about the communist threat from the USSR, but also a 
resurgent or even neutral Germany.22 U.S. policy makers also insisted that the Basic Law of 
the Federal Republic contain certain institutional and policy safeguards that would preclude a 
repetition of the past, namely strong federalism and a decentralized fiscal system.23 The 
renunciation of chemical and nuclear weapons and severe constraints on the deployment of 
the Bundeswehr (after 1955) were also strongly supported by U.S. policy makers. 
 Nevertheless, such concerns were not filtered through the lens of the Holocaust, but rather 
more traditional realist concerns about power, resources, and war-making capacity.  
The Nazi and Holocaust framing of Germany and the U.S.-German relationship really came 
to the fore towards the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany. Part of this 
was due to the rise of Holocaust consciousness and the Americanisation of the Holocaust, 
dating to the 1970s.24  Popular culture was crucial in this process, exemplified by the airing of 
the NBC miniseries Holocaust in 1978. The Bitburg Affair in 1985, where Helmut Kohl and 
Ronald Reagan attempted to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the end of WWII at a military 
cemetery containing the graves of members of the SS became an international incident, 
condemned by a vote of the U.S. Congress.25 The movement to establish a Holocaust 
Memorial Museum started with Jimmy Carter and was opened in 1993 by Bill Clinton—the 
‘year of the Holocaust’ when Schindler’s List also was released. Memorials and museums are 
found across the country today and the Holocaust has also become a mandatory part of many 
secondary school curricula in the various states.26 Increased attention over the 1990s towards 
debates in Germany about this memory were push and pull factors in the greater salience of 
the Holocaust filter utilised towards Germany.  
More recently, there is evidence that a more positive filter, less encumbered by the past, has 
arisen among Americans. This is marked by a respect for recent German achievements—the 
culture of contrition, Germany’s soft power, soccer, the strong economy and export prowess. 
Certain aspects of the German model have been especially lauded—vocational training (even 
by Trump), the ability to maintain a vibrant manufacturing sector, low inflation, sound public 
finances and relatively little debt. Especially after Merkel’s shift in policy regarding the 
refugee crisis in 2015 and then after Trump’s victory in November 2016, there was much 
praise at least from the centre and left for Germany and Merkel being the last bastion of 
liberal, Western values. Some even tout her as ‘the leader of the free world’.27  
 Another development over the last few years is that beyond a bipartisan consensus on some 
issues, e.g. both Democrats and Republicans have criticised German trade surpluses and other 
related policies (artificially low value of the Euro to boost German exports), the most 
vehement criticism now appears to come from the right. Previously, criticism of Germany 
came from the left, i.e. criticism of inadequate coming-to-terms with the past, the perceived 
lack of sensitivity towards any xenophobic attack or politician, allegations of political-
cultural continuity with the Nazi past. With the image of Germany transformed—now into a 
liberal icon—a lot of the most vehement criticism has come from the right—the so-called alt-
right, which promotes ‘America First’ via Breitbart, for example.28  
 
 
German Filters towards the US 
 
Such distinct phases of perception are not as evident on the German side. Throughout the 
postwar period, Germans have had divided, even contradictory attitudes towards the U.S. For 
example, the adult generations of the 1950s and 1960s were fairly pro-American and 
Atlanticist and there was much goodwill towards the U.S.—thanks to the Berlin Airlift (with 
the raisin or candy bombers), the nuclear/security guarantee, the Marshall Plan and more 
general U.S. support for rehabilitating the FRG as quickly as possible and integrating it into 
NATO and other organisations. JFK was treated as a hero during his trip to the FRG and 
West Berlin in 1963, when he gave his famous ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ speech. Reagan at least 
partially rehabilitated his war-mongering image in Germany with his famous ‘Mr. 
Gorbachev, tear down this wall’ speech almost exactly 30 years ago, while also reaffirming 
western solidarity.29  
 Another high point of good will surrounded the process of German reunification. U.S. policy 
makers, especially President George H.W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker were 
steadfast supporters. They helped to assuage the concerns of other allies like France, Britain 
and the USSR. Right before formal unification on October 2, 1990, Bush stated: 
The United States is proud to have built with you the foundations of freedom; proud 
to have been a steady partner in the quest for one Germany, whole and free. America 
is proud to count itself among the friends and allies of free Germany, now and in the 
future. Our peoples are united by the common bonds of culture, by a shared heritage 
in history. Never before have these common bonds been more evident than in this past 
year as we worked in common cause toward the goal of German unity. Today, 
together, we share the fruits of our friendship.30 
 
Helmut Kohl, speaking for many Germans, returned the admiration stating that ‘George Bush 
was for me the most important ally on the road to German unity.’31 
But there was always an underbelly of criticism—and not just from Frankfurt School 
intellectuals who disdained ‘Americanisation’ as crass, standard-less, consumerist drivel.32 
After all, the U.S. was a victorious and occupying army with bases around the country. The 
U.S. Air Force had helped to destroy many German cities not too long before. The generation 
that experienced this remembered. And of course the late 60s—just 20 years after the 
founding of the FRG—saw much leftist criticism of U.S. ‘imperialism’—in Vietnam, Iran 
and the ‘Third World’ more generally. The peace movement of the 70s and early 80s was 
often explicitly anti-American, for example in its opposition to the NATO ‘double-track’ 
decision. Similar opposition occurred in the early 2000s over the Bush administration’s 
decision to invade Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.33  
Despite Barack Obama’s high level of personal popularity, there were many tensions in the 
U.S.-German relationship during his presidency. German and European policy makers 
understood that the so-called ‘pivot to Asia’ would decrease American security assets in and 
attention to Europe.  
 U.S. policy makers also disagreed with German policy responses to the financial and 
especially the Euro crisis.34 Paul Krugman spoke for many U.S. policy makers in 2013 when 
he pointed out Germany’s contribution to the crisis: ‘Yet Germany has failed to deliver on its 
side of the bargain: To avoid a European depression, it needed to spend more as its neighbors 
were forced to spend less, and it hasn’t done that … Germany’s trade surplus is 
damaging.’35 Tensions persisted when the German government broke with allies and failed to 
join the action against Libya in 2011. Then, in 2013, news broke that the U.S. National 
Security Agency (NSA) had been spying on German leaders like Angela Merkel. This 
reminded many Germans of their totalitarian history with attitudes to secret service tapping 
being very much influenced by the collective memory of this history. By 2014, only 35 per 
cent of Germans expressed trust in the U.S., compared to 74 per cent when Barack Obama 
took over.36  
The last years of the Obama era became a high point of comity—indeed at times Obama was 
(much) more popular in Germany than at home. Merkel and Obama developed a particularly 
close collaboration and friendship, forged in the joint effort to manage and solve various 
crises, such as post-2014 Russian aggression, the Euro crisis, the Paris Climate Agreement, 
and the Iranian nuclear deal. During one of his last trips to Europe in April 2016, President 
Obama described the bilateral relationship with particularly warm words:  
On behalf of the American people, I want to thank Angela for being a champion of 
our alliance.  And on behalf of all of us, I want to thank you for your commitment to 
freedom, and equality, and human rights, which is a reflection of your inspiring 
life…I have to admit that I have developed a special place in my heart for the 
German people…And as always, I bring the friendship of the American people.   We 
consider the German people, and all of our European allies, to be among our closest 
friends in the world.37  
 
 
 
 
GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE TRUMP ERA 
 
 German-American relations under the 45th president have entered, at the best, a phase of 
uncertainty, and, at the worst, a nadir. As David Frum, former speech-writer to George W. 
Bush opined: ‘The spinal column of the Western alliance is the U.S.-Germany relationship, 
and Trump has undermined it since Day One.’38 Given the wild swings in policies and tweets 
from Donald Trump, assessments of the state of relations change rather frequently. Early in 
the campaign in October 2015, Trump was very critical of Merkel: ‘They’re going to have 
riots in Germany … I always thought Merkel was, like, this great leader. What she’s done in 
Germany is insane.’39 In December 2015, he said she was ‘ruining’ Germany with her 
refugee policy.40  Then in August 2016 he stated that ‘Hillary Clinton wants to be America’s 
Angela Merkel, and you know what a disaster this massive immigration has been to Germany 
and the people of Germany. Crime has risen to levels that no one thought would [sic] they 
would ever see.’41 
This came after he expressed great respect—albeit with a degree of bitterness—for her: 
‘Germany’s like sitting back silent collecting money and making a fortune with probably the 
greatest leader in the world today, Merkel … She’s fantastic … highly respected.’42 During 
their first meeting at the White House in March 2017, the tensions were palpable. There were 
allegations that Trump did not shake Merkel’s hand when asked and that he presented her 
with a ‘bill’ for what Germany owed the U.S. for providing security.43 But then, not much 
later, Trump was talking about the excellent chemistry he had with her. In May 2017, Trump 
criticised Germany again at the NATO meeting and G7 Summit and then in a variety of 
tweets. Germany was ‘bad, really bad,’ German automobile exports were unfair (singling out 
BMW) and Trump asserted once again that the country owed the U.S. money for security. 
Newspaper headlines spoke of Merkel and Trump ‘hating’ each other.44  
Trump has also made unsettling comments about the European Union, probably the most 
important German foreign policy precept. He supported Brexit and asked publicly, which 
 member state will be next to leave. Yet, at other times he has said: ‘The EU, I’m totally in 
favour of it. I think it’s wonderful, if they’re happy. If they’re happy – I’m in favour of it.’ 
But then he went on: ‘You look at the European Union and it’s Germany. Basically a vehicle 
for Germany. That’s why I thought the UK was so smart in getting out.’45  
Before the G20 Summit in July 2017, he pointedly visited Poland, where he was feted by the 
ruling national-conservative Law and Justice Party. He reiterated the dominant narrative of 
Polish history: ‘What great spirit. We salute your noble sacrifice and we pledge to always 
remember your fight for Poland and for freedom… Your oppressors tried to break you, but 
Poland could not be broken.’ Although he did finally affirm the Article 5 guarantee and 
committed to Western values such as freedom of speech, gender equality, and the rule of law, 
he also conceived of the West in terms that do not align themselves easily with the more 
universalist or postnational manner dominant in Germany:  
Americans, Poles, and the nations of Europe value individual freedom and 
sovereignty. We must work together to confront forces, whether they come from 
inside or out, from the South or the East, that threaten over time to undermine these 
values and to erase the bonds of culture, faith and tradition that make us who we are. 
If left unchecked, these forces will undermine our courage, sap our spirit, and weaken 
our will to defend ourselves and our societies…The world has never known anything 
like our community of nations. We write symphonies. We pursue innovation. We 
celebrate our ancient heroes, embrace our timeless traditions and customs, and always 
seek to explore and discover brand-new frontiers.46 
 
Finally, most explicitly, he points out the central role of history and memory, even though he 
does not elaborate on the specifics: 
 
Our own fight for the West does not begin on the battlefield -- it begins with our 
minds, our wills, and our souls. Today, the ties that unite our civilization are no less 
vital, and demand no less defense, than that bare shred of land on which the hope of 
Poland once totally rested. Our freedom, our civilization, and our survival depend on 
these bonds of history, culture, and memory.47 
 
The views of Trump’s former advisor and chief strategist, Stephen Bannon also matter, even 
though he was forced to resign from these formal roles in August 2017. Overall, Bannon 
 thinks the European Union is a threatening example of ‘globalism’ and was thus a strong 
supporter of Brexit. In his widely quoted 2014 Vatican speech he noted:   
I think strong countries and strong nationalist movements in countries make strong 
neighbors …That is really the building blocks that built Western Europe and the 
United States, and I think it’s what can see us forward … the world, and particularly 
the Judeo-Christian West, is in a crisis … [Europeans want] sovereignty for their 
country, they want to see nationalism …They don’t believe in this kind of pan-
European Union.48 
 
Merkel responded to Trump’s election victory with her usual aplomb, although a sharper 
edge was evident in the message: 
Germany and America are bound by common values — democracy, freedom, as well 
as respect for the rule of law and the dignity of each and every person, regardless of 
their origin, skin color, creed, gender, sexual orientation, or political views. It is based 
on these values that I wish to offer close cooperation, both with me personally and 
between our countries’ governments.49 
 
Her then Vice-Chancellor and current Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel was harsher: ‘Trump 
is the trailblazer of a new authoritarian and chauvinist international movement. … They want 
a rollback to the bad old times in which women belonged by the stove or in bed, gays in jail 
and unions at best at the side table. And he who doesn’t keep his mouth shut gets publicly 
bashed.’50  
Months and several awkward meetings later—including the NATO Summit when Trump 
would not formally support Article 5 or the G7 Summit in Italy in May 2017 where he 
pushed another leader out of the way and expressed misgivings about the Paris Climate 
Agreement, Merkel stated at a campaign rally: ‘The time in which we could fully rely on 
others is a bit in the past … I have experienced that in the past several days. And, because of 
that, I can say now that we Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands.'51  
Although it is difficult to predict how the situation will develop, the negativity and 
equivocations from the White House have had a deleterious impact in Germany. A Harvard 
University study of media coverage of Trump’s first 100 days showed that Germany’s public 
 television channel was the most critical with 98 per cent of stories coded as negative.52 
Germans have also had a more unfavourable view of the U.S. compared to other Europeans 
in 2016: 57 per cent of Germans had a favourable view, versus 63 per cent of French people 
or 61 per cent of British people.53  
Trump’s negative comments about NATO, the European Union, and Germany’s trade surplus 
have created much consternation. In February 2017, 78 percent of Germans viewed Trump 
with concern, whereas only 58 per cent took the same position towards Putin’s policies.54 By 
late June 2017, confidence that the U.S. president would do the right thing regarding world 
affairs had plummeted to 11 per cent of Germans versus 86 per cent at the end of Obama’s 
presidency. There were similar declines in many other countries, and only increases in Israel 
(slight) and Russia.55 Representatives of the Trump administration have also been met with 
public ridicule—such as when Ivanka Trump tried to defend her father’s treatment of women 
in Berlin in April 2017, when Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross was allegedly cut off for 
going over his allotted time when addressing a CDU group in June 2017, and during protests 
in conjunction with the G20 Summit in Hamburg in July 2017.56 
 
 
UNDERSTANDING TRUMP? 
 
There does not seem to be a foreign policy area that is important to the Germans that has not 
been unsettled or discredited by the Trump administration—the European Union, the Euro, 
NATO, the UN (Trump deemed it an ‘underperformer’ and wants to eviscerate U.S. 
funding57), policy towards Russia,58 Iran, the Middle East more generally, 
climate/environment, trade and TTIP.59 But, how can we understand Trump and the policies 
of his administration? And how does he view history, which historical periods, events and 
 phenomena does he invoke to formulate and substantiate ‘his message’? And, of course, what 
collective memory strands do politicians and the press resort to in order to evaluate President 
Trump and what he stands for? What key collective memory strands is Trump tapping into, 
promoting or even creating?  
The key text (of twelve books on business and politics) here is The America We Deserve, 
published in 2000 when Trump contemplated running for the presidency for the Reform 
Party.60 As is the case with many texts allegedly authored by politicians, we do not know, of 
course, how much or how little of the content can actually be attributed to Trump himself. 
We have to assume however, that the texts reflect his views at least to a degree. Much of 
what he wrote in this book—for instance on immigration, tax policy or a dystopian view of 
contemporary America—has also been expressed since he became president. For instance, he 
lauds his family: ‘I haven’t been as successful in my marriages as my parents were, but 
marriage is not the only family value that matters. The importance you give to your 
relationship with your kids is a family value.’ (25) His political self-image and basis of his 
appeal is also evident: ‘But I’m also bringing a perspective to politics that most politicians 
don’t have. I’ve built a multi-billion dollar empire by using my intuition.’ (35)  
Trump has little to say about the past and what he does say is couched in his life-history. He 
does seem to be particularly drawn to the Great Depression (character-building), the 1950s 
(the golden age), and the 1970s (decadent decline): ‘I will never forget the 1970s, when 
reckless regulators were running the show—make that horror show.’ (45) In a section called 
‘Our Next Comeback,’ he lauds the American dream and his father and grandfather: ‘In those 
days you didn’t hoof it down to the welfare line when hard times hit, you hit the bricks 
looking for work.’ (42) All of this prefigures his 2016 campaign slogan ‘Make America Great 
Again,’ harkening back to the mythical golden age of the 1950s,61 or even Theodore 
Roosevelt in the early 20th century—a time of rapid industrialization and growth and great 
 fortunes (the robber barons).62 Regarding German history, at various points, he expressed 
disagreement with positive comments Pat Buchanan made about Hitler around that time: 
‘Hitler was a monster and it was essential for the allies to crush Nazism … My grandfather 
was German. But I am proud of the vital role the United States played in defeating the Third 
Reich.’ (17). Trump subsequently reconciled with Buchanan, who has actually said that his 
ideas (economic nationalism) have finally triumphed with the 45th president.63 
His thinking on foreign policy is also outlined. He notes: ‘In the modern world you can’t very 
easily draw up a simple, general foreign policy … We deal with all the other nations of the 
world on a case-by-case basis. And a lot of those bystanders don’t look so innocent.’ (111) 
He also articulated criticism of NATO:  
Pulling back from Europe would save this country millions of dollars annually. The 
cost of stationing NATO troops in Europe is enormous, and these are clearly funds 
that can be put to better use. Our allies don’t seem to appreciate our presence anyway. 
We pay for the defense of France, yet they vote against us at the United Nations and 
choose the side of the North Koreans, the Libyans, and other rogue nations. (142-143) 
 
His policy flip-flops as president are also prefigured and grounded in at least a vague 
conception of history: 
But, ultimately, I don’t think that we should abandon Europe completely … His 
[Buchanan’s] recommendations of appeasement toward the Nazi regime sounds 
exactly like what liberals said about Hitler in the ‘30s and what liberal today are 
saying about rogue states like North Korea. If you applied the same doctrine of 
appeasement to domestic criminals, you’d be giving murderers and armed robbers 
stern reprimands and setting them free. (143) 
 
His views on trade have also barely changed. He sees the world in martial, zero-sum terms. 
Everything is deal–making and he proclaims a unique skill set in this regard: ‘Frankly, there 
are many aspects of trade where my negotiating skills could be useful.’ (147)64 Moreover:   
It’s become cliché to say that business, especially trade, is like war …. But cliché or 
not, it’s true. Germany and Japan were our enemies in World War II, and for decades 
afterward each was a powerful competitor in trade—tough in peacetime as each had 
been in war. (Though both have fallen on lean times recently, they will become 
worthy adversaries again.) We didn’t make the best possible trade deals with them. 
We’re not making smart deals now … the core of these problems is that we don’t 
 know how to negotiate. We don’t know how to get what we want out of the people 
we’re sitting across the table from. (146) 
 
There is a constant tendency to define the world in Manichean terms. Americans are always 
the good guys and there is a constant need to have bad guys, some ‘worthy adversary’, 
opponent, enemy, or ‘other’—illegal Mexican immigrants, North Korea, China, the European 
Union, or perhaps now Germany. Trump also seems to always require a dramatically staged 
‘feud’—previously with Rosie O’Donnell, during the campaign with a gold star family and 
with ‘Morning Joe’ journalists Mika Brzezinski and Joe Scarborough. He also seems to have 
problems with facts, for instance that trade deals are negotiated with the EU and not 
individual member states like Germany, and he has flirted with conspiracy theories 
(birtherism) and conspiracy theorists (Alex Jones).65 
One of the references most frequently used by Donald Trump has been ‘America First’ which 
relates to the isolationist, anti-Semitic group which pushed for America to stay out of the 
Second World War. It had also been used as a slogan by Woodrow Wilson and more recently 
by Pat Buchanan. Trump has used the phrase extensively during his election campaign but 
also during his first few months in office.  
Just like America’s other allies, German politicians reacted with concern at the suggestion 
that the United States wanted to withdraw from its international role. As Robert Kagan has 
pointed out, the phrase gained more prominence after the Iraq and Afghan wars and the 
financial crisis to the point that it became a ‘national phenomenon’. According to Kagan, 
there was a transition away from considering the United States as an ‘indispensable nation’, 
as Bill Clinton had phrased it, already under President Obama with Trump’s election 
representing a ‘decisive break’ from this internationalist tradition.66 As one commentator put 
it, ‘[t]he history that haunts them [the Europeans] is that of the 1930s, when a self-absorbed 
America stood by as Europe fell to fascism and war.’67 It was the lessons learnt from the 
 1930s, however, that led Washington to design ‘a new, US-led global order’ after the Second 
World War.68 
In a press statement on the outcome of the US presidential elections – and presumably in 
response to Trump’s use of the slogan ‘America First’ during the election campaign – Merkel 
pointed out that the importance of the outcome of presidential elections went far beyond the 
United States. She emphasized that those who govern this large country carry responsibility 
which can be felt nearly everywhere in the world.  Addressing concerns that had been raised 
during the campaign about Trump’s lack of democratic credentials, Merkel asserted that the 
bond between Germany and America was based on common values – the appreciation of 
which can clearly be seen to have arisen out of the experience of Germany’s totalitarian pasts. 
It was only on the basis of these values that Merkel offered the new President Trump close 
cooperation.69 
As it turns out, Trump has shifted his position in the meantime considerably from describing 
NATO as obsolete to confirming its significance for transatlantic relations and peace and 
stability (for example during the British Prime Minister Theresa May’s visit to Washington in 
January 2017, in a telephone conversation with Merkel on 28 January 2017, and in his 6 July 
2017 speech in Warsaw70). He also explicitly dismissed the idea of being an isolationist in a 
press conference with Angela Merkel.71 
Trump thus seems to have used references to ‘America First’ only as soundbites to mobilize 
his following rather than actually evoking a particular memory or message. Without paying 
much attention to the historical context of the slogan, he thus seems to have disconnected 
memory from history altogether, giving it a life of its own in the process.    
The past that does seem to play a role in President Trump’s understanding of the world is the 
one that goes right up to his inauguration as President, that is the bad past from which he 
wants to ‘liberate’ the American people. With his slogan ‘Make America great again’, he has 
 frequently also referred back to a better past, however, being quite nostalgic about this past, 
without ever really pinpointing to when this past was. Particularly in his inaugural address, 
President Trump evokes images of a liberation from an oppressive past of the American 
people, some kind of oligarchy, which he describes as an ‘American carnage’ which ‘stops 
right here and stops right now’. He speaks of a ‘great national effort to rebuild our country 
and to restore its promise for all of our people’, promising to transfer power from Washington 
and ‘giving it back to you, the American people’. In his view, ‘January 20th 2017, will be 
remembered as the day the people became the rulers of this nation again’ and American will 
be made ‘great again.’72 
References to a better past seems to have persuaded some Americans. According to Anne 
Applebaum, Trump’s appeal to the working class was cultural since he promised them to 
bring back the kinds of jobs their fathers had and ‘by implication, the whiter, simpler, post-
war world when America had no real economic competition.’73 
But how has the Trump administration handled America’s traditional collective memory 
strands? On 27th January, Holocaust Memorial Day, Trump managed to make a widely 
criticised statement in which he omitted to mention the millions of Jews that were killed in 
the Holocaust.74 Interestingly, although Trump in his usual outspoken manner criticised 
Germany and Angela Merkel for her refugee policy, Germany’s trade surplus and for using 
the EU as a vehicle to advance Germany’s economic interests and Germany (also more 
widely, Europe) for a lack of burden-sharing in terms of defence, and although it would have 
been very easy, he has not made use of German history, in particular the Nazi past, to 
underline his views. Besides the Warsaw speech discussed above, the one memorable time 
that former press secretary Sean Spicer referred to the Nazi past was a very unfortunate one 
when – after the poison gas attack in Syria – he claimed that not even somebody as 
 despicable as Hitler had sunk to using chemical weapons during World War II and referred to 
concentration camps as ‘Holocaust centres’ (for which he later apologized).  
In the bilateral relationship, Trump also does not allude to a common history. In the joint 
press conference with Angela Merkel during her visit to Washington in March 2017, he 
emphasized that the two countries share the ‘desire for security, prosperity and peace.’75 
Angela Merkel, however, right at the beginning, undertakes an excursion into the past:  
Let me look back into the past. We, the Germans, owe a lot to the United States of 
America, particularly as regards the economic rise of Germany. This was primarily 
due to the help through the Marshall Plan. We were also able to regain German unity 
after decades of the United States standing up for this, together with other allies, and 
standing by our side during the period of the Cold War. And we are gratified to know 
that today we can live in peace and freedom as a unified country due to that.76  
 
In order to get a fuller picture, it is also important to consider the references to history the 
world around Trump has used to assess him and his policies. There is no doubt that his 
election victory has very much been assessed with references to totalitarianism. His advent to 
power has been described as ‘the end of the west’, ‘the end of the liberal era’ and ‘a new 
fascism coming to power’ and Trump himself has been described as ‘not a democrat’ but a 
‘fascist’ with parallels being drawn to Mussolini and Hitler. His advent to power has also 
been described as the beginning of a new ‘authoritarian era’.77 
In his column in the Washington Post, Robert Kagan, in a piece called ‘This is how fascism 
comes to America’, on 18 May 2016 issued the following warning:  
This is how fascism comes to America, not with jackboots and salutes (although there 
have been salutes, and a whiff of violence) but with a television huckster, a phony 
billionaire, a textbook egomaniac ‘tapping into’ popular resentments and insecurities, 
and with an entire national political party – out of ambition or blind party loyalty, or 
simply out of fear – falling into line behind him.78 
 
 
When Barack Obama made his last phone call as American President to Angela Merkel, this 
was interpreted as not just a goodbye but described as him ‘handing over his baton. The 
German Chancellor isn’t just the leader of Europe, she is now the de-facto leader of the free 
 world.’79 Trump’s travel ban, the attempt to stop people arriving from countries with a 
predominantly Muslim population, confirmed his illiberal stance and the concern that 
America was turning into an inward looking country which discriminated against people 
based on their religion. A title page of the news magazine Der Spiegel in early February 2017 
which showed the American President beheading the Statue of Liberty expressed this 
criticism. The cartoonist himself said that the image represented ‘the beheading of 
democracy’ and that he wanted to compare Islamic State and Donald Trump, saying ‘both 
sides are extremists’.80 
Also drawing on this dichotomy, when Angela Merkel visited the American President in 
March 2017, the New York Times described it as ‘an awkward encounter that was the most 
closely watched of his young presidency’ which took on ‘an outsize symbolism’: ‘the great 
disrupter confronts the last defender of the liberal world order.’81  
A lot of Trump’s views go against everything Merkel stands for considering that she grew up 
in a totalitarian regime: his dismissive views of the press, his plans to build a wall, his 
illiberal stance that does not accommodate diversity. As one commentator put it, ‘Trump is 
no doubt Merkel’s idea of a nightmare US president. Growing up in the communist bloc, she 
always saw America as a key repository of western values.’82 Particularly Trump’s plan to 
build a wall between the US and Mexico is clearly unlikely to evoke pleasant memories of 
the German Chancellor who grew up in the GDR.  
Trump’s attack of the media (or in his words, ‘the fake news media’) as the ‘enemy of the 
American people’ reminds observers of a phrase commonly used by authoritarian and 
totalitarian regimes to discredit its critics. The term ‘enemy of the people’ (‘Volksfeinde’) has 
been used by dictatorships throughout history to describe and discredit political opposition as 
‘the enemy within’ and to justify its fights against these ‘internal enemies’. 
 Trump’s attack of the press as ‘the fake news media’ also brings to mind the term 
‘Lügenpresse’ (‘lying press’). It is probably best known for the way the Nazi regime 
dismissed the free press as using their outlets to spread lies. The term Lügenpresse has more 
recently also been resurrected by the Islamophobic Pegida movement and the AfD in 
Germany to discredit the critical press.83 
Whether Trump is actually aware of the historical connotations, is unsure. In either case, it is 
worrying. His appointment of Stephen Bannon – even though he was not part of the 
administration for long - who is widely known as right-wing and anti-Semitic as his advisor 
and chief strategist who even became a member of the Principals Committee of the National 
Security Council initially (he was removed from that already in April 2017), was certainly of 
concern and supported the evocation of references to totalitarianism and fascism. 
According to the BBC correspondent Jenny Hill, the anniversary of the Reichskristallnacht 
(‘Night of the Broken Glass’) and the fall of the Berlin Wall – ‘and all that they represent of 
this country’s past – explain, partially at least, why Germans were so repulsed by Donald 
Trump’s election rhetoric and why so few (4 per cent by one poll’s reckoning) wanted him in 
the White House.’84  
 
 
THE END OF MEMORY? 
 
Trump does not appear to have the standard provision of references to history available to 
him like other politicians. He seems to use historical references at face value, for example, 
‘America First’ – probably not realising that the isolationist stance associated with the term 
did not work well in the past. But overall, there are not many references to history at all. 
Trump and his team do not seem to have much awareness of history and of the presence as 
 having evolved from history. Maybe he does not need to use collective memory (or maybe he 
just cannot because his historical knowledge is very restricted) because he is not afraid to use 
blunt messages. Whereas other politicians use collective memories to make their case and 
substantiate their arguments, he just says directly what he thinks and does not seem to see the 
need for making a case by evoking particular memories or historical parallels.  
Maybe Trump has just taken the use of collective memory to an extreme. He uses references 
to history as soundbites which help him mobilise his followers. This is also what other 
politicians do, albeit in a more sophisticated way. They use collective memory strands in a 
kind of ‘pick’n’mix’ or ‘bricolage’ way to make their points. Trump has just taken this 
further by disconnecting it pretty much altogether from the historical context—in a rather 
postmodern, ‘floating signifier’ fashion. (It has been pointed out that Trumpism is 
appropriating and inverting the identity politics and concepts of the left).85  
Rather than employing collective memory strands to make his point, he seems to reference 
his own history and experience in his politics. As one source told the Guardian in the context 
of the ill-fated G7 summit on Sicily in May 2017: ‘Every time we talked about a country, he 
remembered the things he had done. … Scotland? He said he had opened a club. Ireland? He 
said it took him two and a half years to get a licence and that did not give him a very good 
image of the EU.’86 Maybe the use of personal rather than collective memory is to be 
expected from somebody with a personality that has frequently been described as 
narcissistic.87 
Perhaps there is more going on here, though. Perhaps we are witnessing the end of memory, 
specifically, the end of memory’s direct impact. Germans may no longer actively remember 
the support of the U.S. against the communist threat. And perhaps Americans, Trumpistas in 
particular, are no longer seeing Germany through a Cold War or Holocaust lens. Perhaps this 
is the ultimate moment of normalisation—cold, hard reason; self-interest; deals. Indeed, 
 much has been made of Trump’s ahistorical, deal-based leadership style. This was perhaps 
best summed up by two advisors, stating that Trump has 
a clear-eyed outlook that the world is not a ‘global community’ but an arena where 
nations, nongovernmental actors and businesses engage and compete for advantage. 
We bring to this forum unmatched military, political, economic, cultural and moral 
strength. Rather than deny this elemental nature of international affairs, we embrace it 
… we delivered a clear message to our friends and partners: Where our interests align, 
we are open to working together to solve problems and explore opportunities … In 
short, those societies that share our interests will find no friend more steadfast than 
the United States. Those that choose to challenge our interests will encounter the 
firmest resolve.88 
 
The contrast with Merkel and other European leaders could not be stronger. This is a rather 
Nietzschean moment—Umwertung aller Werte—where what has been said or thought about 
the other is now inverted. It was not that long ago that observers fretted deeply about parallels 
to Weimar in Germany—during the wave of xenophobic violence in 1992 for instance, or 
when the unemployment rate spiked in the 1990s first in eastern Germany and then in the 
western regions as well (sick man of the euro). Now there is a small library full of such 
analyses of the U.S. and Trump.  
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